SCADA Vulnerabilities & Exposures (SVE)

CRITIFENCE® SCADA Vulnerabilities and Exposures Database (SVE)

[SVE-648072300] Schneider Electric Triconex Tricon

Date Type Platform Author EDB-ID CVE-ID OSVDB-ID Download App SIS Signature
2018-04-17OtherSchneider ElectricThis vulnerability was discovered by NCCIC and Schneider Electric during the investigation of the HatMan malware.N/ACVE-2018-8872 CVE-2018-7522 N/AN/AN/A

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# Schneider Electric Triconex Tricon

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### VULNERABLE VENDOR

Schneider Electric





### VULNERABLE PRODUCT

Triconex Tricon, model 3008 





### RESEARCHER

This vulnerability was discovered by NCCIC and Schneider Electric during the investigation of the HatMan malware.





### AFFECTED PRODUCTS

The following versions of Triconex Tricon, a Safety Instrumented System, are affected:

MP model 3008 firmware versions 10.0-10.4






### IMPACT







### VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW

3.2.1   IMPROPER RESTRICTION OF OPERATIONS WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF A MEMORY BUFFER CWE-119

The system call reads directly from memory addresses within the control program area without any verification.

 Manipulating this data could allow attacker data to be copied anywhere within memory.

CVE-2018-8872 has been assigned to this vulnerability.

A CVSS v3 base score of 10.0 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)





3.2.2   IMPROPER RESTRICTION OF OPERATIONS WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF A MEMORY BUFFER CWE-119

When a system call is made, registers are stored to a fixed memory location.

Modifying the data in this location could allow attackers to gain supervisor-level access and control system states.

CVE-2018-7522 has been assigned to this vulnerability.

A CVSS v3 base score of 7.9 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is (AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H)







### BACKGROUND

Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Multiple Sectors

Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide

Company Headquarters Location: France








### MITIGATION



Schneider Electric recommends that customers upgrade their firmware to the latest 11.x version.  Contact Schneider Electric support for instructions.



The HatMan malware requires unrestricted access to the safety network via remote network or physical access. Additionally, the malware requires the Tricon key switch to be in the “PROGRAM” mode to successfully deploy its payload.



Schneider Electric continues to recommend users always implement the instructions in the “Security Considerations” section in the standard Triconex documentation (i.e., Planning and Installation Guides and TriStation 1131 Developers Guide), which include the following:



Ensure the cybersecurity features in Triconex solutions are always enabled.



Safety systems must always be deployed on isolated networks.



Physical controls should be in place so that no unauthorized person would have access to the safety controllers, peripheral safety equipment, or the safety network.



All controllers should reside in locked cabinets and never be left in the “PROGRAM” mode.



All TriStation engineering workstations should be secured and never be connected to any network other than the safety network.



All methods of mobile data exchange with the isolated safety network such as CDs, USB drives, DVD’s, etc. should be scanned before use in the TriStation engineering workstations or any node connected to this network.



Laptops and PCs should always be properly verified to be virus and malware free before connecting to the safety network or any Triconex controller.



Operator stations should be configured to display an alarm whenever the Tricon key switch is in the “PROGRAM” mode.